By: Farrah Al Abdallat
Jordan Daily – The recently announced U.S.-Saudi strategic defense agreement may become one of the most consequential security developments in the Middle East in years. While many of the technical details remain under negotiation, the political message is unmistakable: Washington is formalizing Riyadh as a key security partner,essentially elevating it to the level of a major non-NATO ally-at a moment when the region’s military balance is already fragile. The broader defence relationship is expanding in parallel. Washington recently approved Saudi Arabia’s purchase of nearly 300 American tanks-an acquisition that boosts Saudi military readiness and secures hundreds of American manufacturing jobs.
At the center of this shift lies a single, highly symbolic question-whether Saudi Arabia may eventually gain access to the F-35, the world’s most advanced stealth fighter and a platform Israel has long considered essential to preserving its qualitative military edge.
For decades, Israel has been the only Middle Eastern state operating the F-35. This monopoly has become the cornerstone of its air superiority and a core element of U.S. policy, reinforced through legislation ensuring that Israel maintains a “qualitative military edge” over its neighbors.[1] In a region where deterrence, survival, and rapid escalation coexist, the ability to dominate the skies is more than a military advantage; it is a political instrument that shapes how every other actor calculates risk[2].
The U.S.-Saudi agreement unsettles this long-standing arrangement. Even though Washington has not formally committed to selling the F-35 to Riyadh, the upgraded partnership signals that such a transfer is no longer unthinkable. The deal includes deeper defense cooperation, new layers of air and missile defense, and unprecedented intelligence coordination.[3] In strategic terms, it brings Saudi Arabia closer to a class of capabilities that have long been reserved for Israel alone. From a realist perspective, states react not only to shifts in hard power, but also to signals about future intention. For Israel, the signal is clear: its privileged position is no longer guaranteed. This is further validated with trumps comment on Israel’s prefrence on Riyadh receiving warplanes of reduced calibre.
Israel’s unease is already visible. Senior officials have openly warned that any future F-35 sale to Saudi Arabia would undermine Israel’s qualitative edge and complicate its ability to deter both state and non-state rivals.[4] Israeli dominance of the skies has allowed it to project power far beyond its borders and to operate with a level of freedom unmatched in the region. The idea that another major Arab state-even one not currently hostile-could acquire comparable technology represents a profound strategic shift.
The UAE’s experience reinforces why this moment matters. Abu Dhabi joined the Abraham Accords partly in the expectation that normalization with Israel would unlock access to the F-35.[5] Yet the deal stalled amid Israeli objections, U.S. concerns over Chinese technology in the UAE, and changes in Washington’s regional priorities.[6] The lesson for Gulf states was clear: normalization alone is not enough. Saudi Arabia appears determined not to repeat that path. Instead, Riyadh is securing defense guarantees first, ensuring that any future diplomatic shifts begin from a position of strength.
The implications reach far beyond the Gulf. Iran could interpret the U.S.-Saudi defense pact as part of a broader containment strategy, and its likely response will be to deepen asymmetric capabilities-ballistic missiles, drones, and regional proxy networks despite its exhausion from its own war.[7] The Houthis in Yemen, already entrenched in confrontation with Riyadh, may view enhanced Saudi defenses as a provocation rather than a deterrent, potentially escalating cross-border drone and missile attacks. Meanwhile, Israeli leaders may intensify pressure on Washington to preserve strict limitations on what Saudi Arabia can acquire. Furhetmore, a second layer of concern lies in the nuclear dimension of the U.S.-Saudi partnership. Washington and Riyadh are advancing a civil-nuclear cooperation framework that, while officially limited to peaceful energy use, introduces strategic uncertainty in a region already defined by mistrust. For Iran, any Saudi access to U.S.-backed nuclear infrastructure-however tightly regulated-signals the emergence of a rival latent capability. Even the perception of a future Saudi enrichment pathway could accelerate Tehran’s own nuclear ambitions, adding yet another pressure point to an already volatile balance.
These developments risk setting off a new arms race in the Middle East, in which we have seen unfold with Iran and Israel earlier this year. If Saudi Arabia inches closer to F-35-level technology, other Gulf states are likely to demand the same. Israel, facing the possibility of losing its monopoly, will seek accelerated access to next-generation aircraft. Iran, unable to match advanced aviation platforms, will double down on missiles, drones, and electronic warfare. The result is a regional security environment defined less by stability than by competitive procurement and strategic mistrust.
Although Saudi Arabia’s prospective acquisition of the F-35 would not immediately replicate Israel’s air superiority, it would still represent a strategic shift. Israel’s F-35I Adir remains a uniquely customised variant, equipped with indigenous electronic warfare suites, command-and-control systems, and domestically developed weapons integration-features no other F-35 operator possesses[8]. These elements preserve Israel’s long-standing U.S.-guaranteed Qualitative Military Edge. Yet even this advantage is no longer entirely insulated from future challenges. Riyadh’s growing cooperation with U.S. and Western firms in artificial intelligence and advanced digital technologies introduces a degree of uncertainty: over time, Saudi Arabia could potentially develop its own software enhancements, data-analysis tools, or mission-planning capabilities for any future F-35 fleet. Such developments would not mirror the depth of Israel’s customisation, but they could gradually narrow the technological gap, signalling that Israel’s qualitative edge-while still intact-is becoming less absolute than it once was.
The U.S.-Saudi deal therefore represents more than a bilateral realignment. It is part of a broader redistribution of power in a Middle East already undergoing rapid transformation. Israel’s uncontested air superiority-the single most important factor shaping the region’s military balance-may be entering a period of challenge. Saudi Arabia, no longer content with playing a secondary military role, its positioning itself in a manner where its set to become a central security actor. Iran could view these developments as a tightening of the strategic circle around it, while non-state actors may respond with increased escalation.
In realist terms, the region is entering a classic phase of balancing and counter-balancing. Air superiority, once treated as an Israeli constant, is now a variable in flux. The future of the Middle East’s skies-and the strategic calculations that flow from them-will depend on how Washington manages its commitments, how Riyadh pursues its ambitions, and how Israel adapts to a new era in which its technological lead is no longer guaranteed.
[1] U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Possible U.S.–Saudi Agreements and Normalization with Israel, CRS Report R48162 (2024).
[2] Justin Katz, Airpower in the Middle East: Strategic Implications for the United States and Its Partners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2023).
[3] Simon M. Smith, “The China Factor in U.S.–Saudi Talks for a Defence Pact,” Mediterranean Politics 30, no. 4 (2025).
[4] Al Jazeera. “Saudi Arabia Designated Major Non-NATO Ally of US, Gets F-35 Warplanes Deal.” November 19, 2025.
[5] Grant Rumley, “Unpacking the UAE F-35 Negotiations,” Analysis (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), February 15, 2022, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/unpacking-uae-f-35-negotiations
[6] Ned Coonan, “Gulf Arabs Fear Israel is Becoming Goliath,” Middle East Institute, August 12, 2025.
[7] Philippe Legrain, “An Emergent U.S.-Favoured Regional Order in the Middle East and its Challenges,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 23, 2025.
[8] Gideon Grudo, “Israeli F-35s,” Air & Space Forces Magazine (April/May 2017): 62–65.