By: Farrah Al Abdallat
Research Analyst
Jordan Daily – Syria under Ahmad al-Sharaa’s leadership has accommodated the presence and intervention of foreign military actors even more than it did under Bashar al-Assad. Despite expectations that Assad’s fall might restore some degree of sovereignty, Syria continues to demonstrate all the characteristics of a proxy state-its political decision-making, territorial control, and security landscape shaped less by Damascus and more by the competing agendas of regional and global powers [1].
U.S. intervention in Syria has undergone significant shifts over the past decade. Under the Obama administration, Washington adopted a cautious approach, moving away from direct military intervention toward “leading from behind” and a strict “no boots on the ground” posture [2]. In practice, this meant operating through local allies such as the PYD/YPG, legitimizing their role by positioning them as partners in the fight against ISIS. That framework changed dramatically under Trump’s second presidency and Al-Sharaa’s rise. The United States has returned to a posture of direct military presence. Statements in November confirmed Washington’s intention to establish a new military base in southern Syria-on top of nearly 19 bases it maintains across the Middle East.
What makes this new deployment possible is Syria’s accession to the international coalition against ISIS, which effectively legalises the U.S. presence under Al-Sharaa. But the choice of location reveals broader strategic motives: reducing Hezbollah’s weapons access routes through Syria into Lebanon, monitoring Iranian logistical corridors, and anchoring a long-term American footprint in a region where both Russia and Iran have historically expanded with little resistance. Crucially, this shift also reflects the fact that Iran’s once-dominant influence is no longer uncontested. The fall of Assad disrupted the networks Tehran had spent over a decade cultivating, while intensified Israeli airstrikes and a more assertive U.S. return have narrowed Iran’s operational space-signalling a gradual erosion of the leverage it once held.
Washington’s agenda therefore goes beyond counterterrorism or potential mediation between Damascus and Tel Aviv. The establishment of a new U.S. base marks a broader strategic recalibration aimed primarily at countering Russian and Iranian influence. Moscow-long entrenched through Tartus, Khmeimim, and its role in Syrian defense and reconstruction-now faces a renewed American presence in territory it had come to view as its uncontested sphere. This re-entry by the United States not only weakens Russia’s grip but also revives a rivalry reminiscent of the early years of the 2011 conflict, when Syria became the focal point of a broader struggle between Washington and Moscow. Under Al-Sharaa, this competition has resurfaced with new intensity, with both powers viewing the transition period as a decisive moment to shape Syria’s future[3].
Russia’s role in Syria remains the clearest example of great-power competition transforming the country into a proxy arena. For Moscow, Syria represented its last strategic foothold in the Arab world-a legacy extending back to the Cold War. When the uprising threatened Assad’s rule, Russia intervened decisively to preserve its influence, culminating in the 2015 military operation that reshaped the war. Moscow’s objectives went beyond regime survival: it sought to reassert itself as a global power, counter U.S. dominance, and display military capabilities through operations like long-range missile strikes from the Caspian Sea. Over time, Russia entrenched itself through Khmeimim, cultivated ties with Iran and later Turkey, and positioned itself as an indispensable arbiter of the conflict. Yet today, with Washington re-establishing a presence on the ground and engaging diplomatically with Al-Sharaa, Russia must re-negotiate the authority it once exercised largely unchallenged.
China and Turkey played sharply contrasting but equally significant roles in reinforcing Syria’s role as a proxy theatre. China maintained a distant but influential stance, aligning consistently with Russia at the UN to block Western-backed resolutions and uphold non-intervention principles that countered evolving humanitarian norms. Beijing’s involvement remained mostly diplomatic and economic, but it helped shape the international parameters of the conflict[4].
Turkey, on the other hand, was deeply embedded in Syria’s regional dynamics. Initially supporting the opposition alongside Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Ankara shifted course as U.S. backing for the PYD/YPG clashed with its own security priorities. This rupture pushed Turkey toward tactical alignment with Russia through the Astana process, enabling Turkish military operations in northern Syria while sidelining Washington. Today, Turkey’s expanding role in post-Assad Syria-combined with renewed U.S. military activity-illustrates how external power competition continues to overshadow Damascus’s authority. Ankara’s new military cooperation accord with the Al-Sharaa government gives Turkey influence over Syria’s army reconstruction and counters U.S.-backed Kurdish forces. Meanwhile, the American base in eastern Syria has reignited Turkish fears of a U.S.-protected Kurdish corridor. Once again, Damascus finds itself navigating between Turkish pressure and American-Kurdish dynamics, underscoring how its institutions remain shaped by foreign agendas rather than independent national authority[5].
Israel’s approach further emphasises Syria’s continuing function as a proxy arena rather than a sovereign state. Netanyahu’s demand for a sweeping buffer zone from Damascus to the Golan Heights reflects a long-term Israeli strategy to reshape Syria’s internal geography to blunt Iranian power projection. Israel’s intensified air campaign, expanded military footprint in the south, and conditional engagement with Al-Sharaa all serve one purpose: preventing Iran from re-establishing the corridor linking Tehran to Hezbollah. Israel is not responding to a sovereign neighbour; it is dictating the rules of engagement inside a fragile state unable to assert full territorial control.[6]
Sectarian violence remains another enduring challenge that mirrors dynamics under Assad. Sectarian divisions, long instrumentalised for regime survival, have resurfaced with force: more than 3,400 people have been killed in sectarian clashes over the past year. From Sunni-Alawite violence in Homs to attacks on Alawite communities along the coast and renewed fighting between Bedouins and Druze in Sweida, the fractures are deep and volatile. Prejudice and harassment against Alawites-seen as remnants of the old regime-remain common. Minority-dominated areas such as the Kurdish northeast and Druze-majority Sweida remain hesitant to reintegrate under Damascus, deepening the trust deficit with the transition government. Without genuine confidence-building measures, communities turn increasingly to external patrons, leaving Syria highly vulnerable to foreign interference and cementing sectarianism as a central feature of its political landscape[7].
A year after Assad’s fall, Syria remains far from reclaiming genuine sovereignty. Al-Sharaa governs a landscape still shaped by foreign militaries, competing regional agendas, and renewed U.S.–Russia rivalry that echoes the dynamics of 2011. Iran’s influence has narrowed, Turkey and Israel have expanded their roles, and sectarian divisions continue to fracture the country’s social fabric. Rather than entering a post-conflict era, Syria has become even more entangled in external power struggles. Until Damascus can regain control over its territory and reduce its dependency on outside actors, Syria will remain a proxy state whose future is determined not in the capital, but in the calculations of others.
[1] Aron Lund, Syria’s State Institutions and the Government’s Control (Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, 2019).
[2] Muharrem Ekşi, “The Syrian Crisis as a Proxy War and the Return of the Realist Great Power Politics,” Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi 1, no. 2 (October 2017): 106–129.
[3] Giuliano Bifolchi, “Assessing Russia’s Strategic Realignment in Syria and the Middle East: Insights from Alexander Hoffmann,” SpecialEurasia, January 2, 2025, https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/01/02/russia-syria-hoffmann-alexander/.
[4] Muharrem Ekşi, “The Syrian Crisis as a Proxy War and the Return of the Realist Great Power Politics,” Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi 1, no. 2 (October 2017): 106–129.
[5] Tuvan Gumrukcu, “Turkey to Help Syria with Weapon Systems, Equipment under New Accord, Source Says,” Reuters, August 14, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-help-syria-with-weapon-systems-equipment-under-new-accord-source-says-2025-08-14/.
[6] Usaid Siddiqui, “Syria’s al-Sharaa Promises Peace and Unity in Face of Israeli Aggression,” Al Jazeera, December 6, 2025.
[7] Mona Yacoubian and Will Todman, “Syria’s Promise and Challenges One Year After Assad’s Fall,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), December 4, 2025.