By : Sanad El-Naser
Jordan Daily - The Jordan-Syrian border has emerged as a significant focus in recent times, serving as a clear indicator of Syria's ongoing sovereignty crisis. While headlines may suggest it resembles a typical border drug smuggling operation, the reality reveals a rising danger to state authority, territorial control, and regional stability. The production of Captagon in Syria, responsible for 80% of the world's supply, continues to rise, particularly in the Al Suwayda region, transcending mere criminal activity and evolving into a pivotal political and economic element within Syria’s fragmented structural framework. (Mansour and Al-Tarawneh, 2026)
Since the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime on December,09,2024, there were high hopes that the Syrian Captagon economy had been crippled and had most likely collapsed, because during Assad’s regime, Captagon production was strongly associated with regime-linked networks, armed actors, and the Syrian war economy. However, the persistence of production and trafficking, especially in southern Syria, shows that regime collapse alone does not automatically restore sovereignty. Criminal economies do not disappear simply because political leadership changes. They adapt, relocate, and survive in areas where the state remains weak. (Mansour and Al-Tarawneh, 2026)
This situation is now observable in the Al Suwayda region, which is currently identified as an area where the state exhibits diminished capacity in control and oversight. While Damascus may formally claim sovereignty over all of Syria on paper, it doesn’t, because effective sovereignty requires more than legal authority. It requires strict border controls, strong leadership, the dismantling of criminal networks, the enforcement of the law, and the prevention of foreign actors from shaping internal security conditions. In Suwayda, this authority remains deeply contested. (Hubbard, 2024)
This is where Jordan's intervention in combating the production of Captagon in Syria, particularly in Al Suwayda, becomes critical to regional stability. In recent days, the Jordanian Air Force conducted strikes in the Al Suwayda area and accurately targeted drug-producing operations. However, this also serves as a political message from Amman, because the Captagon trade is not a distant Syrian problem; it is a direct national security threat. When drug networks operate near Jordan’s border, Syria’s internal weaknesses become Jordan’s external threat.
Jordan is conveying a definitive and emphatic message that it cannot remain in a state of indefinite anticipation for Damascus to reestablish authority over southern Syria. Should the Syrian government lack the capacity to inhibit the illicit movement of drugs, arms, and armed smugglers toward Jordanian territory, Jordan will undertake measures to safeguard its sovereignty and borders. This situation establishes a delicate regional dynamic: the weakness of one state compels another to intervene beyond its borders.
This approach also reflects Jordan’s broader national security strategy under the leadership of His Majesty King Abdullah II, who has consistently placed the protection of Jordanian citizens and the Kingdom’s borders at the centre of state policy. In the context of the Jordan–Syria border, the threat is not abstract; it directly affects Jordanian society, border communities, national security institutions, and the country’s internal stability. King Abdullah II has repeatedly emphasised that Jordan will not allow regional instability to spill over into the Kingdom or threaten the safety of its people. Therefore, Jordan’s response to the Captagon crisis should be understood not only as a military or security measure, but also as an expression of sovereign responsibility. Protecting the Jordanian people remains the state’s highest priority, and the actions taken along the northern border demonstrate that Jordan will act decisively when its security, sovereignty, and social stability are placed at risk.
To comprehend the dynamics of this crisis, it is essential to consider Robert Putnam’s two level game theory framework. Putnam contends that states operate on two concurrent levels: the international level, where governments interact with other states, and the domestic level, where they confront internal pressures, political constraints, and societal demands. The Captagon crisis exemplifies this framework distinctly. It is not solely a border-security issue between Jordan and Syria; it is also influenced by internal vulnerabilities within Syria, security concerns within Jordan, and Israel’s regional strategic calculations.
At the international level, Jordan aims to secure its borders and curb the rising flow of Captagon into its territory. Meanwhile, Syria seeks to restore its image as a developing sovereign state. At the same time, Israel intervenes by shaping the security environment in southern Syria to serve its strategic interests. On the domestic front, each actor faces distinct pressures: Jordan’s government must address public and institutional demands to protect society from drugs, smuggling, and armed infiltration; Syria’s government struggles with weak institutions, economic collapse, local armed groups, and the political risks of confronting Suwayda too forcefully; and Israel exploits instability in southern Syria to justify further security interventions. (Moravcsik,1991)
Putnam’s theory demonstrates that the Syrian government has a very limited "Win-set," representing the narrow range of acceptable agreements satisfying both international and domestic pressures. Internationally, Syria must reassure Jordan on border control, but domestically, it likely lacks the political, military, and economic capacity to manage Suwayda without risking further instability. Therefore, the Captagon issue cannot be solved with declarations alone, as structural constraints are at play (Putnam,1988). The core problem is Syria's severe capacity deficit: restoring authority over Suwayda is not just about deploying security forces. The government also faces economic collapse, fragile institutions, fragmented security systems, and limited legitimacy. Addressing criminal networks in the south is a complex challenge to state-building (Moravcsik,1991).
This creates a dangerous contradiction: Syria needs economic aid and investment to rebuild its institutions, but it also needs a strong state to attract such investments and ensure stability. As long as Captagon networks, armed factions, foreign interventions, and weak central authority influence southern Syria, external investors see the country as politically unstable. Insecurity stalls development, and lack of development sustains illicit economies. Israel’s role complicates matters further. Its airstrikes and military operations in southern Syria increase uncertainty and make sovereignty issues more complex. Whether claiming security concerns or border defence, Israel's actions turn southern Syria into a more internationalised region, shifting control away from Damascus.
For Jordan, the threat is immediate, while for Syria, it is both institutional and existential. If Damascus cannot restore credible authority in the south, Suwayda will remain a contested space with criminal networks, local factions, and regional actors operating without effective state sovereignty. Captagon reflects more than a drug war; it symbolizes Syria’s unfinished state-building process, where domestic fragility and regional insecurity reinforce each other. Jordan’s strategy to curtail upstream Captagon production and weaken the influence of drug cartels should not be viewed as a purely Jordanian matter. It is a regional security necessity. The Captagon trade does not stop at a single border, nor does it threaten only one society. Its networks span states, exploit weak governance, and deepen instability across the Middle East. Therefore, Jordan’s response benefits not only its national security but also the wider region. By confronting the source of production, not merely the symptoms of smuggling, Jordan is also contributing to a broader regional effort to limit criminal economies, protect communities, and create more stable conditions for economic growth and investment.
Sanad El-Naser, is currently an MSc student in Global Political Economy at King's College London.
Reference:
· Mansour, M. and Al-Tarawneh, M. (2026) ‘Syria’s Suwayda: A new hub for the multibillion-dollar Captagon trade?’, Al Jazeera, 6 May. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/6/syrias-suwayda-a-new-hub-for-the-multi-billion-dollar-captagon-trade
· Hubbard, B. (2024) ‘Captagon, the stimulant at the center of Syria’s narco-state’, The New York Times, 13 December. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/13/world/middleeast/captagon-stimulant-assad-syria.html
· Erkmen, S. and Ozcelik, B. (2025) ‘Violence in Suweida reveals Syria’s volatile transition challenge’, Royal United Services Institute, 23 July. Available at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/violence-suweida-reveals-syrias-volatile-transition-challenge
· Putnam, R.D. (1988) Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International Organization. 42 (3), 427–460. doi:10.1017/S0020818300027697.
· Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft
· Fritz W. Scharpf “The Joint-Descion Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration” 66, no.3 (1988) : pg 239-278
