Dr. Rami Nasrallah
Jordan Daily - In 1923, Ze'ev Jabotinsky (the father of Revisionist Zionism) formulated what became one of the most influential strategic doctrines in Israeli political thought: the “Iron Wall.” Writing in his famous essay, The Iron Wall (We and the Arabs), Jabotinsky argued that a Jewish state could only be established and sustained through an unassailable military force -an “iron wall” strong enough to convince hostile neighbors that resistance was futile.
For decades, this doctrine shaped Israel’s strategic culture. The “Iron Wall” translated into a society organized around defense, unity in the face of external threats, and the maintenance of overwhelming military superiority. In practice, it meant defending the state and ensuring deterrence against neighboring countries, while the expansion and consolidation of Israel’s colonial project focused primarily on the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 War. The underlying logic echoed a modern adaptation of the historical Jewish ghetto experience: survival depended on strong walls, internal cohesion, and the determination to defend them against persistent external hostility.
Today, however, Israel’s current wars suggest that its strategic doctrine may be undergoing a profound transformation. The traditional “Iron Wall” was “fundamentally defensive”. The emerging doctrine, by contrast, appears increasingly expeditionary, grounded in the capacity to project force far beyond Israel’s borders. Israeli operations and strategic discourse now frequently invoke the notion of the country’s “long arm” meaning its ability to strike distant targets, control or penetrate sovereign airspaces, and conduct military operations across vast geographic ranges, from Yemen to Iran and beyond.
Air power has always been central to Israeli strategy. Since 1967, Israel’s air superiority has been considered a cornerstone of its security doctrine. For decades, Israeli aircraft have operated freely over the skies of Syria and Lebanon, where geographic proximity facilitated operational dominance. Yet Israeli military assessments increasingly acknowledge that air superiority is becoming more complex. Advanced missile systems, drones, and integrated air defenses deployed by regional adversaries are challenging the traditional balance.
As a result, a new form of air superiority has recently emerged in Israel -one based not only on aircraft but on integrated technological ecosystems that combine real-time intelligence, cyber capabilities, precision weaponry, layered missile interception systems, and adaptive command-and-control networks. Preserving operational freedom now depends on the fusion of technology, doctrine, and intelligence rather than on simple dominance of the skies alone. The current war with Iran illustrates this evolving approach and how it increasingly prioritizes the creation of a de facto strategic buffer zone extending far beyond Israel’s immediate borders. The objective is not territorial expansion in the traditional sense, but rather the ability to operate militarily across a broad regional theater that includes Iran and its allied networks in Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere.
The current war with Iran is presented by Israel as a strategic necessity to “complete unfinished work.” Within this framing, the objective goes beyond restoring deterrence or responding to immediate threats. Israeli leaders and strategic circles argue that the war aims to significantly degrade Iran’s military capabilities: particularly its missile infrastructure, command systems, and the networks that sustain its regional influence. The goal is therefore not merely tactical success on the battlefield, but the systematic erosion of adversaries’ political and military infrastructure, including the broader architecture through which Iran projects power across the region through allied actors in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and elsewhere. In this sense, the campaign reflects a shift from a strategy centered primarily on deterrence toward a more expansive doctrine that seeks to weaken Iran’s long-term strategic capacity and reshape the regional balance of power.
Iranian strikes against Gulf countries have been interpreted in Israel as exposing critical gaps in the region’s air-defense systems, including overloaded interceptor capacities, depleted missile stockpiles, difficulties in countering drone swarms and precision-guided missiles, and limited coordination among neighboring states. Yet the emphasis on these “vulnerabilities” also appears to function as part of a broader strategic narrative promoted by Israeli security and defense circles. By highlighting these weaknesses, Israel positions itself as a potential provider of advanced air-defense technologies, early-warning systems, and operational expertise, suggesting that the framing of “regional vulnerability” may also serve as a marketing strategy aimed at expanding Israel’s militarily partnerships and technological exports to Gulf states.
Israeli militarily technology companies celebrated the Iranian strikes against Arab Gulf countries, openly expressing enthusiasm at the prospect of supplying the region with advanced military solutions. According to the leading Israeli economic news outlet Calcalist on March 5, a former senior official in Israel’s security establishment (whose name was not disclosed) stated: "It is possible to sell the Gulf states not only defense systems but also deterrence capabilities, early-warning tools for detecting launches, and the development of civilian defense doctrines, shelters, and protected spaces. There is plenty to work with there." The remarks underscore how Israeli firms see the current regional tensions as a market opportunity to provide both military and civilian protection solutions.
Dr. Yoel Guzansky, a Gulf states expert and former head of the Iran and Gulf Affairs division at the National Security Council, argued in an opinion article for Ynet on March 5, 2016, that Israel could emerge as the region’s security guarantor. He suggested that if Israel acts wisely and discreetly, it could leverage its neighbors’ moments of distress to craft a long-term strategy capable of reshaping the regional balance of power and influence.
Yet this early enthusiasm in Israel remains far from certain. Gulf states are not awaiting external protection. Countries such as Saudi Arabia have been investing heavily in their national defense industries and cultivating diversified global partnerships as part of a deliberate strategy of strategic autonomy. Their evolving foreign policies reflect a commitment to multi-alignment, balancing relations among major global powers while simultaneously strengthening national technological and military capabilities. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has pursued an ambitious agenda to become a global leader in artificial intelligence, integrating AI across multiple sectors, including energy, healthcare, smart cities, and critically, defense. These efforts are part of a broader strategy to assert Saudi Arabia’s regional influence and global standing, demonstrating that its defense and foreign policies are carefully calibrated to reinforce both national sovereignty and leadership in the Middle East and globally.
For the first time, Israel appears to be label this war not merely as a “defensive necessity”, but as a lever to craft a new regional order through military power, rather than through regional economic and trade-corridors strategies it has pursued for years with limited success. Israeli strategists assume that by linking military operations to regional economic and security interests -particularly with Gulf countries- this war could strengthen alliances, enhance Israel’s standing, and create openings for influence that traditional diplomacy and normalization agreements have failed to achieve. Central to this approach is Israel’s military, intelligence, and technological superiority, which serves both as the primary instrument of strategy and a marketable asset capable of reinforcing its regional position.
What sets this war apart from Israel’s previous conflicts is its ambitious scope. The traditional “Iron Wall” doctrine, long centered on defending a fortified state, is now evolving into a strategy emphasizing technological superiority, long-range power projection, and regional influence. Israel’s approach to warfare, deterrence, and its role in the Middle East is clearly undergoing a profound transformation, reflecting an ambition to assert dominance and redefine its strategic position in the region.
Could this war fundamentally reshape Israel’s strategic doctrine? What distinguishes this conflict from previous Israeli wars is its ambitious scope. The traditional “Iron Wall” approach, long focused on defending a fortified state, now appears to be evolving toward a strategy of technological superiority, long-range power projection, and broader regional influence. Israel’s approach to warfare, deterrence, and its role in the Middle East seems to be in flux, reflecting an ambition to assert dominance and redefine its strategic position. Whether this shift will crystallize into a new doctrine remains uncertain, especially since today’s Arab countries are not the same as those Israel faced in 1948 or 1967, differing not only in military capabilities but also in their regional and global roles now and into the foreseeable future.
Dr. Rami Nasrallah is Associate Professor (Hon.), The Bartlett Development Planning Unit (DPU), University College London (UCL). Founder and former Chairman of The International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC), East Jerusalem.
